Gaza’s post-war future includes Hamas, despite Israeli declarations

Israel’s main concern is who will control Gaza after the war. Since early 2024, Egypt has been pushing for an administrative committee to govern Gaza, presenting it as a framework for a new order without Hamas.

The elephant in the room — Hamas’ continued armed presence — is addressed in the initiative with language unlikely to convince Israel: “The proliferation of armed groups in Gaza is a dilemma that can be managed and even eradicated through a clear political horizon and a diplomatic process.”

“Arab states are divided over Hamas’ future, particularly its military strength, and opted for vague wording, acknowledging that the group cannot currently be disarmed or persuaded to disarm,” said Wadie Awawdeh, a columnist for the London-based daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi.

“This is fundamentally unserious, driven by external pressure. Abbas is notoriously fickle,” said Samer Sinijlawi, a senior figure in Dahlan’s West Bank faction.

The White House responded swiftly. “The promoted initiative fails to recognize that Gaza is currently uninhabitable and President Trump remains committed to its reconstruction without Hamas,” it said in a staetment. While not an outright rejection, it highlights the challenges of implementing the plan and ending the war and it did not close the door on Trump’s proposal, contrary to Arab hopes.

“The Arab world isn’t overly concerned with Washington’s response. There’s no viable alternative on the table and Trump may well push Arab states to modify the plan,” Sinijlawi explained. “Notably, some Arab states are dissatisfied with the Egyptian initiative, seeing it as overly tactical, focused on reconstruction and finances without strategic depth.

“A key indicator is that the UAE’s ruler and Saudi Arabia’s crown prince skipped the summit. If these two nations deepen their involvement, alongside assurances that American firms will play a role in reconstruction, Washington’s stance may soften,” he added.

“For 77 years, Arab states have used the Palestinians against Israel, perpetuating their refugee status. Trump’s plan offers Gazans a chance at freedom and should be encouraged. Arab states rejected it without giving it a fair chance,” according to the Foreign Ministry.

The initiative underscores Israel’s limited strategic options and the need to distinguish between feasible solutions and fantasies. Currently, three alternatives exist. The first is a return to the pre-cease-fire combat model — prolonged attrition under the guise of steadily approaching total victory, without clear timelines.

The second is a full-scale occupation of Gaza, which would dismantle Hamas’ military and governmental capabilities but would require domestic consensus, international backing, a large-scale reserve mobilization and immense resources — none of which are currently evident.

In both scenarios, the chance of rescuing hostages alive is almost nonexistent, meaning the slogan of “destroying Hamas and freeing the hostages simultaneously” lacks viability.

The third alternative involves advancing the second phase of the hostage deal and possibly incorporating elements of the Arab initiative. This would come at a steep price, primarily allowing Hamas to remain in Gaza — albeit with its power curtailed through U.S. security oversight and non-Palestinian control of the Philadelphi Corridor.

It’s not an ideal scenario but it’s the lesser evil between the other two, which are currently impractical. Crucially, it remains the only viable path to securing the hostages’ release.

Meanwhile, various unrealistic notions persist — believing renewed fighting will pressure Hamas on hostages, force it out of Gaza or lead to its voluntary disarmament; finding an Arab actor to take over Gaza; or relying on Trump’s plan.

“Author Emile Habibi once sardonically observed that inter-Arab summits serve as a blessing for Israel, as they produce resolutions that continuously shift in Israel’s favor. The current initiative fits that description — it’s not ideal but it contains elements worth considering. Israel’s rigid stance risks missing strategic opportunities, chief among them normalization with Saudi Arabia,” Awawdeh explained

Looking ahead, Israel must align its objectives along a realistic timeline. The simultaneous pursuit of total victory and hostage release is unachievable. The most pragmatic near-term course is advancing Phase II of the hostage deal, despite its steep costs — ending the war and withdrawing from Gaza.

Hamas is unlikely to “fade away,” or collapse in some hypothetical “Gazans’ Spring.” It will always seek to attack Israel and instill in Palestinians a vision of its destruction. Given this reality, in the long term, the only way to uproot Hamas will be through the full control of Gaza, prolonged presence there and the development of a viable alternative.

Such a historic endeavor is best undertaken by a leadership untainted by the failures of October 7 and the flawed assumptions that collapsed that day.

Dr. Michael Milshtein is the head of Tel Aviv University’s Dayan Center Forum for Palestinian Studies.