Hezbollah braces for another Israeli strike, plans cross-border attack, kidnappings

Convinced Israel will attack again soon, it has drawn up plans for a limited cross-border infiltration targeting kidnappings. Before ending his term, Northern Command chief Maj. Gen. Ori Gordin chose a strategic point from which to summarize the war—an experience that may qualify him for his next potential post: head of the Shin Bet.

Khamamis is one of five IDF “penetration outposts” located inside Lebanese territory. It lies between the Israeli town of Metula, about 1.5 kilometers to the southwest, and the Lebanese town of Khiam, roughly the same distance to the northeast. The outpost is under accelerated construction, and it’s where Maj. Gen. Uri Gordin, commander of the Northern Command, has chosen to conclude his tenure, which ends in approximately two weeks. The decision to do so here was apt, just like most of the decisions he made during the war.

Gordin was part of a small cadre of senior officers under Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and operating under the direction of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who used cunning, daring, and deception to blindside Hezbollah. The group didn’t realize its capabilities were being dismantled and that it was losing—until it was too late. Even its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was lost.

But here, on the Khamamis ridge, while Kiryat Shmona sweltered at 35°C, a refreshing breeze blew on Monday, illustrating exactly what Gordin means by a “forward defense.” The five penetration outposts are just the first line separating Metula and the Hula Valley communities from Lebanon. Beyond them, a ground barrier is under construction to prevent incursions by vehicles, ATVs, or on foot. A network of IDF outposts and tank positions along the border and within Israeli territory, bolstered by sophisticated sensors, is designed to intercept anyone approaching the fence.

The Northern Command’s main achievement in the Iron Sword War was pushing Hezbollah back from the border area, north beyond the Litani River. From the outpost’s perimeter, there’s no sign of Lebanese activity in Khiam or Qalliah. Not only has Hezbollah vanished, but the nearby villages’ residents have yet to return. About 1.6 million Shiites once lived along the border; today, they are Lebanon’s problem—and mainly Hezbollah’s. The group and the state must now find alternative housing and daily sustenance for them until reconstruction begins.

This comes as Iran struggles financially, limiting Hezbollah’s annual support to just $1 billion—plus sporadic smuggling of cash and components for rockets and drones. In better times, that sum would have been sufficient for arming up, but under today’s conditions, it’s a drop in the bucket. As a result, Hezbollah recently informed the families of fallen terrorists, orphans, widows, and the many wounded in its ranks that it can no longer provide regular stipends.

According to Maj. Gen. Gordin, 70% of Hezbollah’s military capabilities—including its rocket arrays, command, and control systems—have been rendered inoperable. The elite Radwan force has been cut in half. Still, the outgoing commander warns, Hezbollah is racing to rebuild, believing an Israeli strike is imminent. It is preparing both to defend itself and to carry out a ground assault inside Israel. This new infiltration plan is smaller in scope than the one devised before October 7, but still involves significant forces and includes objectives like the kidnapping of soldiers and civilians.

Thus, the IDF and Northern Command’s current effort in the Lebanese sector is focused on prevention: stopping Hezbollah from restoring its rocket capabilities, reconstituting the Radwan force, or reestablishing itself in southern Lebanon. The group is particularly focused on an area it calls the “Badr Zone,” north of the Litani, where IDF drones and fighter jets relentlessly target weapons depots and rocket launchers identified by growing intelligence capabilities.

At the same time, notes Gordin, the Lebanese Armed Forces are fulfilling their obligations under the ceasefire agreement and preventing Hezbollah from exploiting existing weapons caches or reestablishing itself in the south. This arrangement—whereby the IDF enforces the ceasefire mainly from the air, but also via ground operations—is made possible because an American general chairs the oversight committee. According to Gordin, this is a notable diplomatic achievement.

Still, Israeli defense officials stress that these gains are not enough. Beyond blocking Hezbollah’s return to southern Lebanon or rebuilding efforts elsewhere, Israel seeks to fully disarm the group and eliminate it as an armed player in Lebanon. They say this goal, while not immediately attainable, is realistic.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, a former army chief, is working toward that goal with support in parliament. But in Jerusalem, the assessment is that unless outside powers kick-start Lebanon’s economic and healthcare recovery, Hezbollah will continue exploiting the population’s misery and Iranian funds—even if those funds are dwindling—to keep itself and the Shiite community afloat while the rest of Lebanon sinks deeper into crisis.

The potential game changers remain the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and possibly Qatar. Yet, like global financial institutions, these states await Lebanese reforms before releasing aid. For now, Lebanon appears incapable of even minimal reform—a vicious cycle that may ultimately enable Hezbollah’s recovery.

One last note on Maj. Gen. Gordin: Some critics argue that after October 7, his decision to evacuate tens of thousands of Upper Galilee residents—well beyond the frontline towns—was a mistake. Gordin himself acknowledges that the evacuation may have been too broad, perhaps unnecessarily so. Still, in hindsight, the move likely prevented casualties that would have occurred had more civilians remained in their homes.

What stands to Gordin’s credit is that he didn’t limit himself to defensive preparations against Radwan infiltrations and incoming rocket and drone barrages. He also initiated and pushed forward dozens of special forces ground operations in Shiite villages and adjacent areas near the Israel-Lebanon border. These missions uncovered a massive network of bunkers and staging tunnels built by Radwan fighters, intended for launching assaults.

It was the discovery of these tunnels and bunkers that led the IDF and the security cabinet to greenlight the ground campaign in southern Lebanon, thanks to which residents of northern border communities can now begin returning home in relative safety.

Gordin will step down in two weeks. Having led numerous covert special operations, often in complete discretion, he is widely viewed as one of the top candidates to take over as head of the Shin Bet.