He later gave an interview in which he expressed Gaza residents’ demands more clearly: “We demand Hamas release all hostages and in exchange, Israel will release our prisoners. We’re not against Hamas, they’re part of us but we can’t live under their rule and we must raise white flags.”
The protests took place all over the Gaza Strip for three days last week, but since last Friday no demonstration has been reported.
S., a senior Fatah official from the Strip, says, “Many Gazans, out of despair, have broken the fear barrier, expressing disgust at the endless nightmare.”
Prof. Mahaymarr Abu-Saada, a political science researcher who relocated to Egypt, adds in a conversation: “Hamas must understand this is not just another ‘We want to live’ protest like those in the past, which didn’t really threaten them. If they don’t listen to the people, internal Palestinian clashes in Gaza will develop soon.”
However, it is still too early to write off Hamas or declare the beginning of a “Gazan Spring.” While the protests reflect the ongoing suffering of Gaza’s residents, they have not yet evolved into a direct confrontation with Hamas, with which much of the public still identifies.
Hamas, on its part, launched a campaign claiming that the protests are being driven by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, implying that anyone participating is aiding the enemy. So far, there are no signs of Hamas softening its stance on the war or hostage negotiations, with the terror group sticking to its usual message: releases only in exchange for discussions on a ceasefire and withdrawal from the Strip.
The current wave of protest is fading away and Hamas demonstrated its dominance and strength. However, the potential for a broad popular explosion still exists in Gaza, and is very likely to erupt again in the future.
The project is accompanied by attempts to create an optimistic atmosphere, as reflected in unbalanced reports about “the first large group of Gazans leaving for abroad” (in reality, 70 people with foreign citizenship left for medical treatment in Italy and Romania), or “a sharp rise in the number of people leaving the Strip” (in fact, 200 per week, from a population of about two million).
Meanwhile, Israel continues to publish reports, often resembling trivia quizzes, about countries or semi-countries allegedly agreeing to accept Gazans. The common thread in all these reports is that shortly after they are published, they are vigorously denied. This was the case with Albania, whose prime minister, Edi Rama, claimed in January that the reports were fake news and similarly with Sudan, Indonesia and Egypt, which was recently reported to have agreed to temporarily accept half a million Gazans.
“Cairo firmly rejects any attempt to displace Gazans, viewing it as a threat to its national security. Egypt will not accept Gazans in exchange for economic aid and our foreign policy is not based on barter,” said a statement from the Egyptian Information Ministry this week.
The height of absurdity came with reports regarding entities like Somaliland and Puntland, regions that broke away from Somalia in the 1990s. “The focus of Israel and the U.S. on Somaliland has deep strategic logic,” explains Egyptian researcher Dr. Ra’ib Serjali.
“It’s a backward area but of geostrategic importance, located near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and controlling the movement to the Suez Canal. A promise of recognition and aid could be used as bait to implement Trump’s plan in this area.”
Somali researcher Dr. Ali Kalani argues: “It’s a fantasy that shows a complete lack of understanding of Somalis, who strongly oppose the idea.”
The gap between Israel and the world regarding Trump’s plan once again highlights – as it has many times since October 7 – that fantasies, yearnings and worldviews dominate our discourse and become stronger than pragmatic plans.
This was evident with the idea of creating a clan-based regime in Gaza instead of Hamas, with hopes that Egypt or the Emirates would rule Gaza and do the dirty work for us. Clinging to dreams wastes time and resources, causes damage and diverts attention from core issues, particularly the hostages.
In the meantime, Israelis must question the true goal of the current campaign in Gaza, something the political and security leaderships have avoided explaining to the public. In this context, there’s suspicion that the actual goal is the full conquest of the Strip, which would mean giving up on the hostages, as the chances of freeing them during an all-out war against Hamas are close to zero.
This also opens the door to a dramatic strategic shift, given the heavy and long-lasting security, economic, social and diplomatic price that will be required for the conquest of Gaza and indefinite stay in the area.
It’s a task that will likely need to be carried out in the long term, but it’s doubtful whether the leadership that created the October 7 debacle and lacks domestic legitimacy is the one that should or could lead such a historic move.
