Ronen Bar’s successes and the failures around Oct. 7, profile

Netanyahu has yet to assume responsibility for his part in the failures that led to the massacre. “There is a difference between an elected official and someone appointed to a position,” allies of the prime minister said. “Elected officials can be removed in the ballot box.”

“Bar was issuing threats with bogus investigations of the PMO,” officials close to Netanyahu said. He will bring the firing of the Shin Bet chief to a vote in the cabinet on Wednesday, despite Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara’s warning that that would be in violation of the law.

After being informed that he was to be terminated, Bar claimed that Netanyahu wanted him removed for reasons that were not related to the Shin Bet’s failures and that the prime minister was demanding personal loyalty. “The duty of loyalty placed on the Shin Bet is first and foremost to Israeli citizens. This underlies all my actions and decisions,” Bar said in a statement he released after the prime minister made his intentions known publicly.

“The prime minister’s expectation of a duty of personal loyalty, the purpose of which contradicts the public interest, is a fundamentally illegitimate expectation. It is contrary to the Shin Bet law and contrary to the patriotic values that guide the Shin Bet and its members,” he said adding that he intended to remain as head of the Shin Bet until the hostages are returned, until he completes several “sensitive” investigations – alluding to the probes of the PMO and until his two potential successors were ready to assume leadership of the security service.

Bar’s tenure was supposed to last until October 2026, but he had announced that he would resign earlier after assuming responsibility for his security organization’s failures ahead of the Oct. 7 massacre.

The findings of an internal inquiry into the Shin Bet’s failures, which was released earlier this month, did not mask the responsibility of the top echelon, which failed to warn of the dangers posed by Hamas. It cited a shortage of human intelligence sources in the Gaza Strip and an over-reliance on technological means of surveillance.

But the findings also revealed that Bar and his predecessors had warned Netanyahu that Hamas was not deterred and that the terror group intended to attack Israel. That position was in contradiction to the assessment of the IDF, which Netanyahu adopted.

According to the probe findings, in the years and months leading up to the massacre, the Shin Bet had advocated for the targeted killing of senior Hamas leaders, including Yahya Sinwar and had even planned operations, but those recommendations were repeatedly rejected by the prime minister.

The probe into the failings of Shin Bet was conducted by an independent panel made up of people outside the organization and approved by Netanyahu. It found that the cabinet under his leadership was presented repeatedly with intelligence indicating Hamas was using the funds provided by Qatar – at Netanyahu’s request – to amass its military force, build underground tunnels, produce rockets and munitions and train its Nukhba forces. Despite that, Qatar continued to supply Gaza with millions of dollars each month, over nearly 10 years.